The U.S. went to war in Iran because Iran made itself a Chinese weapon. By Haviv Rettig Gur, in The Free Press.
Across the world, from Brazil to Beijing, London to Karachi, the argument is the same: America is fighting Israel’s war. But this isn’t true. And the confusion matters …
This is not a war about Israel. This is not a war for Israel’s sake. Israel is a beneficiary, a capable and willing local partner, but it is not the reason America is in this fight. America is playing a much bigger game, about more than what happens in the Middle East. …
This isn’t one war, but two.
The small war — the Middle East:
There is a regional chessboard, on which Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the other Gulf states all play. Iran’s proxies, its drones and ballistic missiles, its nuclear ambitions, its funding of Hezbollah and the Houthis: All of that belongs primarily to this smaller game. Israel has always understood this board. So have the Saudis. So has everyone in the neighborhood.
The big war — USA vs China:
But there is a second chessboard, vastly larger, on which the United States and China are the primary players. On this board, the central question of the next 30 years is being worked out: whether the American-led global order survives, or whether China displaces it. Every significant American foreign policy decision, from the pivot to Asia to the tariff wars to the posture in the Pacific, is ultimately a move on this board. …
America is in this fight because of China. Specifically, it is about dismantling the most significant Chinese forward base outside of East Asia.
Iran stepped up from the small war to the big war when it allied with China:
Iran, for most of its history as an adversary of the United States, existed only on the smaller board. It was a headache. It was a regional destabilizer. It funded terrorism, harassed shipping, threatened America’s allies, and kept the Middle East expensive and unpredictable. But it was not, in any direct sense, a threat to American primacy on the global stage. It was Israel’s problem, the Gulf states’ problem, and only tangentially Washington’s.
That changed when Iran made one of the most consequential strategic miscalculations of the century. …
Squeezed by decades of American sanctions and increasingly isolated, Iran turned to China as its economic lifeline. The relationship deepened rapidly. Today, roughly 90 percent of Iran’s crude oil exports go to China, processed through a network of Chinese refineries that operate beyond the reach of American sanctions enforcement. That oil revenue supplies around a quarter of Iran’s budget, a huge portion of which is spent on Iran’s military forces. The Iranian military is thus funded, in significant part, by Chinese purchases.
Without Beijing, the regime cannot pay its security forces, cannot subsidize basic goods, and would soon face the kind of internal collapse that its own ideology has spent 40 years trying to prevent. In other words, Iran has become — has made itself — utterly dependent on China.
China, for its part, was not being charitable. It was being strategic. Iranian oil, sold cheaply because Tehran has no other buyers, has helped Beijing build a strategic petroleum reserve exceeding a billion barrels, enough to sustain the Chinese economy for roughly a hundred days in the event of a naval blockade. China’s single greatest vulnerability is the American Navy’s ability to interdict its energy imports, especially at vulnerable choke points like the Malacca Straits. Iranian oil, flowing outside American oversight, was a direct hedge against that vulnerability. (So, by the way, was Venezuela’s, another U.S. operation that was ultimately about containing China.) …
China was also arming Iran with systems specifically designed to threaten commercial and American military assets. Reports emerged in late February of a near-finalized deal to supply Iran with supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles capable of speeds exceeding Mach 3 and engineered to evade the Aegis defense systems deployed on American carrier strike groups. China was replacing Iranian government and military software with closed Chinese systems, hardening Iran against CIA and Mossad cyber operations. Joint naval exercises between China, Russia, and Iran in the Straits of Hormuz were becoming regular events, building real-time operational familiarity between the three navies. Iran had switched from the GPS system to the Chinese BeiDou system. And Iran was providing China with the port at Jask, as part of China’s “string of pearls” base system in the Indian Ocean.
The picture that emerges from all of this is of a Chinese forward base, a linchpin of the country’s naval architecture; cyber efforts; an economic Belt and Road influence program — every element of Chinese power projection and empire-building — positioned at the throat of the global oil supply, armed with weapons designed to penetrate advanced American defenses and kill American sailors, and embedded in a strategic architecture whose explicit purpose is to constrain American military freedom in any future conflict over Taiwan.
When Iran began to look like that, it stopped being Israel’s problem and became America’s.
Pretty obvious when it’s pointed out. I wonder why the legacy media haven’t mentioned it?