The upcoming fall of the symbol economy is already rearranging political fault lines. By Samuel Thawley in The Spectator.
The rise of symbol manipulation:
My grandfather was a civil engineer. He built things for a living — first in wartime England, then in Tasmania — and in the whole of his working life there was no such creature as a middle manager. There were engineers, and there were the men who dug or put together, and above them all a thin layer of owners, whether public or private. The thick, heavy slab of individuals whose job it is to manage other people who in turn manage other people had not so far been invented.
My parents went to university in Australia in the late 1960s, when — as my former boss keeps reminding me — going to university was a faintly eccentric thing to do; relatively few did at the time.
Within two generations both oddities — the middle manager and the graduate — became unremarkable. We treated them as progress. Indeed, even today it is hard to think of them as otherwise… They do, in fact, form a bubble which will come to represent this era in time, and the relative decline of these two unremarkable elements of the modern age is precisely what should worry us.
The symbol manipulators:
For 50 years, the great growth industry of the Western world has not been mining, energy, or manufacturing, or even finance. It has been the production of people who work with symbols rather than things: the graduate, the manager, the official. Call it the symbolic economy — the side of the modern workforce which processes information, administers, credentials, advises, reports.
It expanded on an unexamined assumption: that cognitive labour would stay scarce, and so valuable, indefinitely.
On that assumption an entire civilisation rebuilt its idea of the good life. Get the degree, join the firm, climb the ladder, and if all else failed there was always the security of the expanding state. …
The upcoming fall of the symbol manipulators:
Four pressures are now converging on the symbolic economy, and it is their convergence, not any one of them, that makes a crash rather than a correction.
The first is overproduction. … A credential that confers status only works if not everyone holds it; a credential everyone holds is merely the new minimum, and confers nothing. We have spent 30 years manufacturing aspirants faster than the economy manufactures the chairs they were promised. Peter Turchin calls the result elite overproduction, and the bill is arriving. …
The second pressure is [that] a pyramid can only lift everyone toward its apex if you keep building new pyramids — new firms, new divisions, new layers needing new supervisors. For decades growth obligingly supplied them. Now, the movement has reversed. Organisations merge, flatten, delayer, consolidate; the apex slots disappear even as the queue of the qualified lengthens behind them. … There is no promotion at the top of a stable pyramid, let alone one that is shrinking. … The single most stall-prone field of all was public administration, the credentialed bureaucracy itself, with nowhere left to promote anyone. …
The third pressure is political, and it is the oldest. To one set of parties the public wing of the symbolic economy is not a workforce but a swamp — a blob, a self-interested administrative class that votes for its own expansion and calls it service. The conviction that government is too big is now shared by new forces such as MAGA, Reform, and One Nation, as well as by a substantial part of the legacy right. …
The fourth pressure is artificial intelligence. Consider what happened before AI:
Washington has just run the experiment for us. The Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) delivered one of the largest peacetime cuts to the federal workforce in decades — something close to a tenth of the administration, gone inside a year. Yet federal spending kept rising — revealing almost no break where the cutting began.
The reasons are twofold. Salaries are no more than a rounding error compared with transfers, pensions and, increasingly, government interest. And across the agencies managers quietly rehired, because the work was still sitting there when the workers had gone. That is the lesson the next reforming government will absorb. You cannot shrink the state by removing people while leaving their work behind; the work simply summons the people back. …
But now with AI:
If the task itself can be done by a machine, as in the era of Victorian industrialisation, then the specific task stays cut. …
Fewer human symbol manipulators, and the blob will shrink the most:
The crash will fall across the whole symbolic economy – the graduate without the salary, the manager without the promotion – but it will fall hardest on the public servant.
The official sits at the purest node of the bubble: the part least disciplined by any market, most swollen by debt, most resented by a major part of the political spectrum, and most exposed to machines, because rules-based processing of information is exactly the work artificial intelligence learns first. …
The end of a trend:
Nothing grows forever, and the symbolic economy that was sold to us as the shape of the future was in truth the shape of a single 50-year expansion that is now passing its apotheosis.
When an expansion so large reprices, it risks creating something that is politically combustible: a large, credentialed, downwardly mobile class promised status as well as comfort and then handed an ordinary stall. They were offered a lounge — but ended up sitting like everybody else on the hard seats in the main concourse. …
Labor is the flagship party of the symbolic economy –- the graduate, the city professional, the official are at once its base and its self-portrait. They rejected the worker for the intellectual; so much that the worker has had to dress up as an intellectual to feel acceptable. So the crash does not merely cost the party votes, it dissolves the world that made the Labor party what it currently is.
This opens up a new, ugly political front. In the US, the new downwardly mobile symbol manipulators who missed out on good jobs have taken over the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) and are currently on course to takeover the Democrat Party:
[Jesse] Watters saved his sharpest criticism for the people making up that socialist wing itself. They’re candidates who have never worked a real job, whose parents bankroll them, and who rack up debt while producing nothing. “They’re professional students,” he said. “They’re all in debt. They don’t earn anything. A lot of them don’t even own anything.” Their answer to that self-inflicted mess is to declare the entire American system rigged.
Watters wasn’t buying it. “It’s actually not rigged if you work,” he said. He described grinding through cramped apartments and lean years before earning success the old-fashioned way, contrasting that with a class of Democrat candidates barely into their careers who insist the American dream is already dead. “They haven’t even tried,” he said. “What are they talking about?”
He rattled off examples, from Texas state Rep. James Talarico (D-Texas) to Democrat Senate candidate Graham Platner (D-Maine) to the socialist candidates in Colorado and New York, calling the current slate “all pathetic people.” Watters argued that their appeal comes precisely from that shared lack of accomplishment.
It’s only the most prosperous society that has ever existed in the history of human civilization, built by the sacrifices of our parents and grandparents, but let’s find a reason to be resentful https://t.co/kyZiiFRtPP
— Joel Pollak (@joelpollak) July 1, 2026
The producers will need to escape their entitled grasp.

















