Russian culture and corruption is losing them the war in Ukraine. By Waterfronts, via Lawrence Person.
Once upon a time, the Russian military was supposed to be the second most powerful on Earth. Today, the Russian military isn’t even the most powerful military in Ukraine. …
From the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, the nation’s armed forces have been subjected to a strange humiliation ritual, partly because of the cunning and innovation of their Ukrainian rivals, but partly because of the sheer bumbling idiocy of their own commanding officers. …
The situation has deteriorated even further in 2026. Russia is losing troops at an unprecedented rate, expending more lives, more munitions, and more state wealth. Even as they capture less and less territory each month, his battlefield commanders are making increasingly poor decisions, and they’re openly lying to their higher-ups when their attacks inevitably fall apart. …
In the Kremlin, Vladimir Putin and his inner circle are being fed a constant stream of false victories when on the front lines, Russia’s spring and summer offensive has fallen flat on its face. …
Moscow still hasn’t learned its lesson. Military planners and strategists all up and down the Russian military, from the unit level on the battlefield to Vladimir Putin himself, still base their decisions and expectations on an aggrandized version of the Russian military that simply does not exist. …
Rampant dishonesty:
Over time that problem is fused with another one. The fact that Russian leaders, again from the unit level all the way to the top, simply refuse to give each other honest assessments of what’s happening. At a certain point, those leaders realized that they could get away with reporting advances, victories, and other good news that didn’t actually exist. …
The problem often starts small on the front lines. A Russian army captain sends a small unit to plant a flag and takes a few selfies in a contested area before that unit is annihilated in drone strikes. And then the captain sends those selfies to his major, claiming that today his forces took the territory in the picture. That same day, the major gets several similar reports from other captains. So he reports to his colonel that the front line has moved up by a few hundred meters when in reality most of the forces under his command have not moved at all. …
That’s a throwaway example, of course, but you get the idea. And that news then travels up the chain until it reaches somebody like chief of the general staff of the Russian armed forces, Valery Gerasimov. We put the spotlight on Gerasimov in particular, because this is how you get statements like the one he made this past April, when he claims that Russia had captured a total of 80 settlements and over 1700 square kilometers since the start of the year. According to independent war monitors, Gerasimov tripled the amount of territory that Russia had actually taken. And of course, he failed to measure the territory that Russia had lost. …
Even Russia’s milblogger class was calling bullshit in the aftermath. …
The groupthink of progress, that no one — out of realistic fears — dare dispute:
But those institutional miscommunications, combined with the Russian military’s inflated perception of itself, combine to form a third problem, a demand for forward progress at all costs. …
At this point in the war, commanders and higher-ups have gotten very used to the idea that their troops are consistently moving forward, consistently taking territory, and consistently getting Russia closer to victory. But now that lie has become too big to fail. And if individual Russian commanders were to report results that don’t align with that lie in places Russia wasn’t expecting, then they are at risk of being demoted, relieved of duty, or even worse. …
As a result, each level of Russian leadership places immense pressure on the next level below them, all the way down to the frontline soldiers. Because their commanders need to deliver forward progress. And because their commanders won’t get into any real trouble if they sacrifice more lives in exchange, those frontline troops are at immense risk of being ordered forward into incredibly risky assaults. …
Of course, it’s not unusual that a soldier on the front line of a major war would face some risk. But there’s a difference between being asked to advance as part of a coordinated push on a well-defined, well-scouted target and being told to sneak into a zone where there’s been no prior scouting and where Ukrainian surveillance and kamikaze drone coverage is expected to be overwhelming. Those are the kinds of situations that Russian soldiers are being ordered into. Not because there’s any expectation that they would succeed, but because their attempt gives their commanders enough plausible deniability to report success. …
Sometimes it works. But the costs of munitions, funds, supplies, and especially human life are so much greater than the value of what Russia’s actually capturing. …
Who dies first?
Nor does Russia particularly care which soldiers get sent to the meat grinder. More and more sources from within the Russian military report the troops are sent into assault units regardless of their other qualifications, including skilled recruits who could make meaningful contributions to enhance Russia’s overall situation. Soldiers with experience in electrical work, logistics management, and even the medical field, have been reassigned against their will to assault brigades, often without explanation. At times, those reassignments come after they were recruited into the military on the promise that they’d be working with their advanced skill set. …
At the best of times, Russian troops were being sent forward into these high-risk assaults with at least a few things going for them: A little bit of training and prep time, a decently well supplied sustainment infrastructure to keep them alive, a possibility of MedEvac if they’re wounded, and a possibility that reinforcements would soon join them if they survive. …
Today, though, that entire support infrastructure has been torn to shreds. Yet, the expectation of forward progress still remains. So, these soldiers are still ordered forward, but they’re overexposed, under-supplied, and isolated compared to what was already a bad situation. When they’re wounded, they aren’t evacuated. They die slow, horrific, predictable deaths. To the point that instead of the usual ratio of killed to wounded in modern war, one killed for every three wounded, Ukrainian assessment suggests that Russia’s balance looks more like two soldiers killed for every one wounded. …
Even worse, the soldiers who are wounded will often be sent back to combat. Every so often, video footage emerges from the front lines depicting soldiers on crutches or in wheelchairs bearing visible shrapnel wounds or dealing with limbs that won’t work like they’re supposed to, forced back into assault units where their death is all but certain.
The corruption in choosing who dies first:
Take an article published this April by The Economist, where a dozen Russian contract soldiers describe a system where low-level infantrymen will bribe their commanders for a position away from the front and then spend a high share of their remaining wages financing their commander’s lifestyle while carrying out unpaid labor on the side. …
As one soldier in that article described, troops often start giving up a portion of their paychecks to buy decent drones or body armor or other assets that might, you know, keep them alive. But then also, quote, ‘You’ll pay forever so they don’t send you to the meat grinder.’
Other Russian commanders have purportedly forced troops to pay exorbitant sums to stay alive and sometimes just to avoid being shot on the spot. …
According to recent reports by exiled Russian journalists, low-level commanders operate more like gang leaders than actual military personnel, in increasingly sophisticated structures that are informed by the high proportion of ex-convicts that now swell the Russian ranks. Often when new troops arrive, commanders confiscate their bank cards and ping codes and threaten violence against those who don’t comply. And when those soldiers are killed, they’re formally reported by their commanders as missing. A change that ensures that money will continue flowing to their accounts. …
Think of frontline soldiers as a pure revenue stream, and even some of Russia’s most asinine decisions start to make sense. When a soldier is wounded in combat, that soldier still receives a paycheck. And if they can be kept on the front lines, then the process of extortion can continue. …
When a higher skill Russian recruit shows up in one of those units, commanders know that they’re likely to have more money, partly because they’re going to be paid on a better contract, and partly because they probably have some form of savings squirreled away from their civilian life. Trap those soldiers in an assault unit, and there’s no limit to what they might be willing to pay in order to avoid the meat grinder. But if they seem as if they’ll cause trouble, then the meat grinder is right there for their commanders to use. …
Awful Russian culture (passed down through their Mongol ancestry?):
Those incentives also help explain increasing reports of physical torture of Russian soldiers by their own commanders on or near the front lines, including soldiers who’ve already been wounded. Our own Warfronts team has encountered footage of Russian troops who’ve had multiple limbs amputated due to combat wounds who were then cling-wrapped onto trees and extorted further. Videos like that can be sent to a soldier’s family who will then ends up paying even more to spare the life of a person who’s locked into conscription or contract by the Russian state. …
The Western tradition of military service demands leaders who will do just about anything for the men serving under them, while Russian officers torture their subordinates for money. …
Quoting researcher Alexandra Arapova [Russian families] are saying that literally we paid everything to have our father, brother, husband not to be killed. In many cases, superiors, they use torture to take money from the soldiers. …
As for the scale of the brutality, we can’t know for sure, but judging by the available information, this kind of treatment is everywhere. One Russian exile outlet, Radio Echo, obtained accounts from soldiers like these, and over a 6-month period in 2025, Radio Echo indicated that they had received almost 12,000 complaints of corruption and violence by Russian commanders against their own men. …
Dysfunctional army:
It’s here that we find the real root of Russia’s ongoing military incompetence. Where Ukraine has spent the last four years learning, adapting, and innovating on the battlefield, Russian generals, defense industrial elites, and low-level battlefield commanders have been building a deeply corrupt machine at every level of the Russian armed forces. That machine exists to extract wealth for the direct and personal benefit of people lucky enough to wield power at the expense of frontline soldiers who aren’t so fortunate.
Vladimir Putin’s military is overrun with people who don’t particularly care about conquering Ukraine as long as they know they’ll be set for life in the post-war Russia that comes next.
That explains a lot.


















