AI Costs More Than The People It Replaced

AI Costs More Than The People It Replaced. By Jemma Green in Forbes.

The present moment looks like this: companies cutting human labour to fund artificial intelligence that currently costs more than the labour it replaces, in pursuit of productivity gains that most studies cannot yet verify, at a pace that is exhausting annual budgets in weeks. …

The technology that was supposed to make human labour obsolete is, at this moment, more expensive than the humans it was meant to replace. Companies are laying off workers to fund the very AI tools that cost more than the workers they just let go. …

Uber’s CTO, recently disclosed that the company burned through its entire 2026 AI coding budget in four months. By March, 84 percent of Uber’s engineers had adopted Claude Code, and roughly 70 percent of committed code now originates with AI. The usage was enormous. The corresponding value was murkier. Uber’s COO and President, Andrew Macdonald, conceded publicly that token usage didn’t seem to correlate directly with useful features shipped to users. …

When a resource becomes cheap enough to waste, people waste it without a second thought. When it becomes expensive enough to matter, they develop a sudden, fervent interest in efficiency. Artificial intelligence appears to be hurtling toward that same reckoning — except the waste is measured in billions, and it arrives on a heavy monthly invoice. …

For a long time, the working assumption was that costs were falling. Per-token prices have indeed dropped, and Gartner forecasts that running the largest models could be nearly ninety per cent cheaper by 2030. The catch is that consumption has scaled faster than prices have fallen. A study by Faros AI found that “code churn,” lines of code deleted versus lines added, increased by more than 800% under high AI adoption. More tokens in, more work thrown away.

AI is still subsidized, not profitable:

The prices companies are paying for AI usage now are not real prices. OpenAI, Anthropic, Google and Meta are all pricing inference below the cost of serving it, burning venture capital to buy market share. OpenAI spends nearly two dollars for every dollar it earns on inference. Sam Altman admitted publicly that the company loses money on its $200 per month subscriptions. The subsidy model started unwinding this year. …

In April 2026, Anthropic moved enterprise customers from flat rate plans to usage based billing tied to actual compute. GitHub followed weeks later with the same shift for Copilot, after years of quietly absorbing up to eight times the subscription value for heavy users. Analysts project that when pricing normalises to reflect real infrastructure costs, enterprise AI bills rise another 30 to 50 percent above current levels. …

Like the Internet bubble in 2000:

The parallel to the late 1990s is instructive. The internet was real technology. And it still produced a [stock market] crash. … The internet was real, it still crashed, and what followed wasn’t less internet — it was internet that finally paid for itself. AI is heading for the same sorting, and the divide is already visible.

Interesting times ahead for investors. A good hard crash in the AI stocks will not only hurt AI investors, but will suck liquidity out of the entire market as investors with loans scramble to meet margin calls, thereby driving down the prices of every other asset as well –especially the ones that are easiest to liquidate and have seen recent profits, such as gold and bitcoin. Bad debts are going to create a huge monetary problem, which will see emergency rate cuts and inflation — which will increase demand for gold and bitcoin.

The system must die because it is too corrupt and the intelligent are walking away

The system must die because it is too corrupt and the intelligent are walking away. By Brivael Le Pogam.

I was talking yesterday with a friend who’s completely desperate. For him, it’s all over: France, the UK, everything’s locked down at the European level. They lie constantly, they want to put people in straitjackets with draconian laws they dress up as “child protection.” They’ve flipped every word: anti-racism has become racism, progressivism anti-progress. In short, objectively, they’ve won.

And yet I’m radically optimistic about the end of this system. For a reason you almost never hear: there’s no intelligence left in it.

Look at their elites. Glucksmann, Édouard Philippe, Attal… second-rate hacks. The last two truly impressive pieces of globalism in twenty years were Obama and Macron. Today, in the US as in France, all that’s left are third-rate hacks [e.g. Kamala Harris, AOC] — and they’re bad. Not “I disagree with them”: bad.

But there’s one rule that never fails: when intelligence leaves a system, the system stops working.

And I say this without contempt, quite the opposite. When Mitterrand came to power, there was real intelligence behind him. Attali is brilliant, sincerely. …

Today intelligence has switched sides: it’s gone over to the technology camp. And nearly all the true builders are starting to see the scam for what it is. They won the old game.

But everyone who knew how to play it has left the table. That’s exactly why it’s going to collapse: a system without intelligence can’t survive the encounter with reality.

Intelligence can make a bad system work:

People often reply to me: “But if your system is so awful, how did it win?” The answer boils down to one word: intelligence.

A system can be morally monstrous and still function — on one single condition: that there’s real intelligence in it. Hitlerism didn’t conquer Europe by magic: behind it was an industrial, scientific, logistical machine of genuine caliber. Stalinism didn’t put a man in space by luck: there were Kolmogorovs, Korolevs, a real scientific elite. Evil + intelligence works. It works damn well, even, and for a long time.

But here’s the point no one wants to see: these systems never last. And they don’t fall because they’re evil. They fall because intelligence always ends up leaving them.

A system built on lies and coercion is, by its very nature, at war with reality. And truly intelligent people are precisely the ones who track reality. So at some point, mechanically, they leave. Or they get purged — because they see too clearly, and seeing clearly becomes a crime.

Where we are now:

And that’s when the real downfall begins. Once intelligence is gone, the system turns into a container for bullshitters and players: brilliant at the internal game, useless at the real one.

And these people have one fatal trait, called negative selection: they never recruit anyone better than themselves. The As recruit As. The Bs recruit Cs, so they’re never threatened. At every level, quality drops a notch. It’s mechanical, it’s irreversible, and it’s exactly what turns an empire into a gerontocracy and a revolution into a decrepit bureaucracy.

Look at Macron. The guy was, in his time, a real stroke of genius — one of the last two smart pieces of globalism. And what did he do? He surrounded himself exclusively with people weaker than him. Not a single one who could outshine him. The perfect signature of a B recruiting Cs. The start of the clown explosion.

That’s why I’m calm. We’re not watching a system at the peak of its power. We’re watching a system that intelligence has already deserted, filling up with third-raters who recruit fourth-raters.

They won the old game. But a system without intelligence doesn’t lose in one battle — it rots from the top, slowly then all at once. Us? We just have to build what comes next.

The rewards for being in the system have shrunk so much its just for midwits and DEI:

Our elite is becoming increasingly mediocre, and that’s normal. Intelligence goes where it is rewarded.

The reward of globalism is increasingly meager: a small position, a precarious little pension, in a system that is on its deathbed.

Everyone knows that this system has no future. The elites most of all. They have all the data, all the reports: they know it won’t hold. Their illusion is tearing apart, and now everyone knows:

  • That pensions are insolvent.
  • That immigration does not integrate.
  • That the country [France] is rapidly growing poorer.

The globalist lie rewarded them for 40 years. But the reward experienced diminishing returns. And now only the mad believe it can continue even for another 10 years.

That’s why competence always tends to follow the truth: it is truth that generates efficiency, performance, results. It is truth that generates growth and confidence.

Truth, today, is in the nationalist and technological camp. The camp of AI and innovation. The camp of free enterprises. That’s where the wealth and optimism are. That’s therefore where intelligence is going.

We know what works:

We know exactly what needs to be done to generate prosperity and make a country functional. It’s not a mystery, it’s not barstool opinion — it’s empirically proven on every continent and in every era: liberalize fully, cut taxes to the max, reduce the size of the state wherever possible.

Why reduce the state? Not out of ideology. Out of pure mechanics.

A bureaucrat is structurally incapable of allocating capital efficiently. It’s not a question of meanness or individual incompetence — it’s mathematical. He doesn’t have price signals, he doesn’t have real-world feedback, he doesn’t have skin in the game. He spends other people’s money, on people he doesn’t know, without ever paying the price for his mistakes. Hayek and Mises explained it all a century ago: without a market, you’re blind. You can’t calculate. You can only improvise on the scale of 68 million people.

Result: public services that collapse, a country that falls behind, people who truly struggle. And in the face of this disaster, they’re told the culprit is the neighbor who succeeded. That if the hospital closes, if the school no longer educates, if you can’t afford housing anymore, it’s because rich people exist.

That’s false. Radically false.

The problem has NEVER been that rich people exist. The wealth of some hasn’t impoverished anyone — a euro earned by creating value isn’t a euro stolen from someone else; it’s a euro that didn’t exist before.

The real problem is a state that takes half of everything you produce to burn it in a machine that doesn’t work, then comes to tell you that your feeling of injustice is the fault of the guy across the way.

Taxing more isn’t « addressing the feeling of inequality ». It’s feeding the beast that created it.

The feeling of injustice is real. But it doesn’t come from those who create wealth. It comes from those who confiscate it to squander it — and who need you to look the other way while they do.

Actually, most of the unearned inequality comes from the system of manufacturing new money out of thin air, and the resulting inflation of the asset markets. But that’s just a bit too complicated for most people to grasp, so bankers and government have been getting away with it for decades — especially since 1971, when the West finally abandoned the constraint of gold.

It’s bad in the UK, but not that bad

It’s bad in the UK, but not that bad. By Dan Hannan.

One of the toughest things in politics is trying to explain that, yes, things are bad, but no, they are not quite as bad as you think. …

It is an argument that almost every British conservative now finds himself having with American rightists. Yes, things are bad. We have no First Amendment. We had a needless surge of immigration, much of it illegal and involving some seriously bad hombres. Our public sector is riddled with the kind of wokery that has been in retreat stateside since 2024.

At the same time, though, no, things are not that bad. Although dim-witted cops disgracefully feel people’s collars over social media posts, these visits almost never result in prosecutions, let alone convictions. We are not at the point of imposing sharia law on a country that is 94% non-Muslim and in which, even among the 6%, there are plenty of secularists. Crimes by minorities are not systematically covered up.

Rape gangs:

This last point is perhaps the most difficult to make. The abuse of white girls by gangs of men, mainly of Pakistani background, in Northern and Midlands towns, was a scandal. Social workers, terrified of being accused of racism, did not investigate as vigorously as they should have. Police officers, for the same reason, hung back. In some cases, victims were not believed. There may even have been pressure from local officials not to pursue some suspects.

These things are shameful. …

It is not true, though, that the crimes were overlooked. The investigative reporter Andrew Norfolk ran a major feature on them at the start of 2011, the first of many front-page stories in the Times. Prosecutions followed, and in 2012, the first gang members were convicted. Was the story as big a deal as it ought to have been? No. The Trumpian vibe-shift had not yet happened, and it was still considered not quite the done thing to dwell on crimes by minorities against white people. When Elon Musk revived the issue on X in 2024, many Brits felt sheepish about not having made more of a fuss earlier. …

250,000 victims?

Even worse is to make exaggerated claims on behalf of the victims. Rupert Lowe, an MP who broke away from Nigel Farage’s Reform to found the more hard-line Restore party, has just published his own “Rape Gang Inquiry Report”, which begins with a false quotation from Einstein and carries on in a similar vein, mingling genuine crimes with implausible allegations.

He asserts, as so many U.S. commentators now do, that 250,000 girls were abused — a figure that has no basis in reality, but was plucked from the air by a UKIP politician. It presents the assaults, not as sexual crimes, but as a kind of jihad — even though every imam has condemned the criminals.

Defending the establishment by pooh-poohing its critics:

Neither [Rupert Lowe or Tommy Robinson] has anything like the reach in Britain that most U.S. conservatives imagine. The first leads a fringe party that will not break into double digits. The second is seen as off-limits by hardcore anti-immigration campaigners because of his repeated run-ins with the law, which he somehow gets away with presenting in the United States as being about free speech.

Both men paint an apocalyptic picture of life in Britain, one that no one in the United Kingdom recognizes, but that confirms the impressions of those whose chief source of news is X. That is why both men have much larger followings in the U.S. than in their own country.

Dan is one the best English conservatives, in government during much of the time of the rape gangs. Would he be feeling a tiny bit responsible? He simply asserts things aren’t as bad as the Inquiry found, offering no evidence. And no, the figure of 250,000 was not simply plucked from the air. And the Koran makes it clear enough that raping non-Muslim women and lying to non-Muslims are perfectly ok with Islam.

The serious efforts I’ve seen place the number of victims between 100,000 and a million. But really, even if it is a hundred it is far too many. Quibbling over the number is just a distraction from the real issues of third world immigration, rape, conquest, political correctness, and Islam.

Dan leaves unaddressed the well-documented reality that the quality of life in the UK for whites has worsened (unless perhaps you live in a nice enclave with high property prices to keep out the undesirables). For example, from today on X:

 

When the Australian Liberal Party capitulated to the Uniparty

When the Australian Liberal Party capitulated to the Uniparty. By Rebecca Weisser in Quadrant.

The hollowing out of the Liberal Party took hold with the “moderate” insurrection that replaced Abbott with Malcolm Turnbull, who took Australia into the Paris Agreement. Despite this shift in favour of renewables and emissions reduction, the Coalition’s great advantage was that it framed energy policy around affordability, reliability and economic growth.

Malcolm Turnbull November 2015

Then came Covid, and the Coalition surrendered to the authoritarian zeitgeist dictated by public health bureaucracies. …

Finally, in 2021, Prime Minister Scott Morrison threw in the towel, surrendering to the progressives and embracing the economy-destroying doctrine of net-zero emissions by 2050. …

A party that once attracted people because they believed in a liberal philosophy increasingly attracted people because it offered a pathway to power.

Debates about climate science, energy security, industrial competitiveness and electricity prices gave way to an ecosystem of subsidies, mandates, grants, investment funds and vested interests. Supporting the energy transition became an article of faith aligned with powerful institutional and financial interests.

The question ceased to be what was good for the country and became what was politically and financially advantageous. Is it any wonder that the party has lost its moorings?

Two divides — conservatism versus progressivism, and markets versus government diktat:

The divide in Australian politics is often presented as one between progressives and conservatives.

Yet there is another divide that is at least as important: the divide between those who value the efficiency of markets and trust civil society, and those who want to use the power of government to direct economic outcomes.

Labor and One Nation stand on opposite sides of many cultural and political questions, but both are considerably more willing than classical liberals to use the power of the state to direct economic outcomes.

Monoculture: parliamentary democracy, English common law, and equality before the law

Monoculture: parliamentary democracy, English common law, and equality before the law. By Jafar Jalili in The Spectator.

Australia’s most vital assets — parliamentary democracy, English common law, and equality before the law –are not neutral tools that ‘fell from the sky’. They are specific products of a Western culture that values the restraint of power and legal continuity.

It is a contemptible form of arrogance to enjoy the fruits of these institutions while insisting that the culture that produced them is irrelevant.

Australia is, at its institutional core, a monocultural society; our laws do not change based on the ‘tribe’ or ‘sect’ of the person standing in court. …

Alien culture:

Labor’s doctrine does not appear to see Australians as equal citizens; it sees them as representatives of ‘favoured racial, religious, or ideological blocs’.

This fragmentation is the antithesis of the Western legal tradition, where citizens meet the state as individuals. By dividing the population into ‘protected identity categories’, the doctrine replaces national unity with tribal competition. This makes a singular, ‘full allegiance’ impossible, as the citizen is encouraged to look first to their sub-group and only secondarily to the nation. If citizenship is treated as just one ‘preference among many’, the strong link between a people and their institutions is broken.

Individualism, capitalism, and liberty are anathema to would-be rulers who see themselves as aristocrats in a newly feudal society. “Progressivism” is a return to the usual human pattern of a small class of aristos, with the help of a military and a priestly/scientific/bureaucratic class, ruling over a mass of peasants — the new term is “communism.”

Why I moved from Britain to Australia

Why I moved from Britain to Australia. By Louise Perry in The Australian.

Louise migrated to Australia last week, with her husband and their two little boys.

So if we’re not “excited” about our move, then why did we do it? …

It’s certainly true that healthcare is better in Australia, and salaries are higher, since Australia is now a significantly richer country than Britain, the two countries having diverged following the 2008 financial crisis. Britain used to be the aspirational destination for ambitious young Australians — including my parents — but that is no longer true, and Australia has been merrily brain-draining Britain for some time now. Our move is perfectly rational in economic terms.

But there is another reason for leaving, one that is more difficult to say out loud. I’m not only unhappy with how things are right now in Britain, I’m worried that they’re set to get a whole lot worse. I started thinking seriously about leaving Britain in 2024, spurred by two things:

  1. My direct experience of the dire state of NHS maternity services.
  2. My unease about the rise of Muslim sectarianism in politics. This was the year in which the “Gaza Five”, a group of politicians who ran on an Islamopopulist platform, were elected to parliament. These candidates ignore the liberal universalist ideals that other British politicians are committed to, instead making explicit appeals to ethno-religious solidarity. Meanwhile, the Pakistani Muslim-dominated cities of Birmingham, Oldham and Bradford have seen multiple cases of arson attacks on politicians’ cars in the lead-up to elections, as well as tyre slashing and threatening messages scratched into the paintwork. Violence is a feature of elections in Pakistan. Is it so very surprising that we are now seeing the same disorder in Pakistani-majority areas of Britain? Paying close attention to current affairs is part of my job, and it became apparent to me that British politics was changing, and not for the better.

I sought out scholarly opinion on the matter, and came across the work of David Betz, a professor of war studies at King’s College London.

He uses established models and ideas within the discipline of war studies to predict that Britain and France are the Western countries most likely to experience the outbreak of a violent civil conflict that would be fought primarily along ethnic lines. Such conflicts would be the product of economic stress, lost political legitimacy, indigestible levels of immigration from culturally distant places, and a sense of “downgrade” among a native population that feels itself to be losing power and status. Britain is, says Betz, “explosively configured”. …

“(T)he steady trickle of retired police chiefs, former civil servants and security officials privately voicing concern indicates that the thesis is apprehended even if never formally endorsed.””

It’s possible these predictions are wrong. But nothing that has happened since 2024 has made me feel more confident about Britain’s trajectory. Since then, we have seen more outbreaks of race rioting and increased political instability. And, all the while, experts warn that the government is borrowing and spending way beyond its means, with welfare spending exceeding income tax revenue. This economic pain will be intensified by the loss to emigration of both the wealthy and the youthful which seems to be under way. A poorer Britain is hardly likely to be a more peaceful Britain.

I realise I’m contributing to this potential doom loop by leaving. Anecdotally, a lot of my peers are thinking along the same lines. A message I received from a friend over the weekend: “every cell of my body wants to emigrate.” If Britons with the means to leave start to do so at scale, then a crisis of mass emigration could be at hand. …

We wouldn’t have left if it weren’t for our children.

The full interview with David Betz:

hat-tip Phil

Populist politics is inherently weak, but it ultimately triumphed last time

Populist politics is inherently weak, but it ultimately triumphed last time. By Eugyppius at American Greatness.

Across the West, the political elites have become estranged from their native populations. This process began in the years after the demise of Communism, and it accelerated in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.

By 1990 the leftist intelligentsia had well and truly hauled itself out of the working class. But now they had quite different economic interests to the working class (whom they despised), so they needed a new politics. I recall conversations among Canberra leftists from the early 1990s: how could they build a new electoral coalition to keep themselves in power, and thus hooked up to the flow of government money? So, they dropped class rhetoric, and took up identity politics instead, appealing to the interests of all voters except white men. Eugyppius focuses on the what happened downstream of that strategic realignment:

The causes are manifold: Cheap money during a long period of low interest rates, ideological radicalization, the lack of clear political alternatives, the cancerous growth of state bureaucratic systems, and the social consequences of globalization within the political classes all played a role. Probably we have yet to understand the causes fully, but the upshot is that our elites have been pursuing crazy policies that are obviously detrimental to their own populations for decades now. …

As postwar television democracy succumbs to the internet and as it is increasingly clear that the fat years are behind us and the future portends nothing but ever leaner years as far as the eye can see, an organic opposition has taken shape. This is the populist backlash, and in each national context it has had different political consequences, although the movement itself is broadly similar everywhere.

  • In Hungary, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz spent 16 years attempting to establish “illiberal democracy” before they were voted out in May.
  • In the United States, where Trump has succeeded in loosely aligning all three branches of government behind his agenda, the MAGA movement is at the height of its influence.
  • In the United Kingdom, Nigel Farage’s Reform and more recently, Rupert Lowe’s Restore have all but eclipsed the Tories.
  • In Germany, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) continues to accumulate support despite withering opposition from the cartel parties and the state itself.

Despite being in a democracy, the ruling class has doubled down against the popular revolts. (Did you know there were over 620 peasant revolts in medieval Europe, which were nearly all successfully suppressed?)

The establishment has reacted to the backlash very strangely. We would expect elites to adjust their politics and adopt elements of the populist program to defang their opponents. Instead, they have ceded incredible ground by doubling down on the very policies that caused the backlash in the first place. Part of this is because we are governed by stupid and parochial elites who don’t understand what is happening to them and why. Another part, however, is probably that elites have assessed the new opposition and decided that this is a passing moment that they can either manage or outlast.

 

 

The ruling class might be right, in that they can just tell the peasants where to go:

I’m not sure they’re right, but more and more I’m also not sure they’re wrong. Since sometime last year, I’ve been thinking a lot about the limitations that beset populist political movements everywhere they have arisen. …

As we’ve become less prosperous and the internet has made the informational environment harder to control, popular sentiment in Western democracies has gone off-reservation. Millions have been politicized in ways contrary to oligarchical preferences. That’s what the populist backlash is, and that’s all that the populist backlash is. I typed that in bold because it is very important to understand: We are talking about people using the democratic processes available to them to confound oligarchical control of the state — mostly by voting for measures, politicians, and parties that the oligarchs don’t want.

Who are the revolting populists, really?

Populist protest voters don’t have armed militias; they lack robust activist cadres; their organization is heavily dependent on social media; and in most cases outside the United States, they are also still in search of elite backers. (One major purpose of the feverishly manufactured political hysteria directed against “the extreme Right” in Germany is precisely to scare away economic and other elites who might otherwise feel tempted to support the AfD.)

The populist backlash is an extremely eclectic movement, consisting of everyone whom the establishment has alienated. …

What emerges from this colorful blend is generally some kind of classical liberal political message combined with a rejection of the most hated elite policies of the past generation, particularly climatism and mass migration. …

The eclectic nature of the organic populist movement causes two major problems:…

  1. There is no real control from the top, and any efforts by party leadership to impose strategy or direction threaten merely to feed rival parties or split the movement.
  2. Second, it’s pretty clear that populist political candidates cannot govern without sooner or later alienating significant constituencies, because these very different people don’t all want the same thing and no single set of policies will satisfy everybody.

Present elites clearly believe that if the AfD ever does get into government, they will succeed primarily in cutting themselves down to size …

We also have to consider the other side of this question — namely, the kinds of people who end up in the leadership of populist parties, the kinds of people who run for office on populist tickets, and the kinds of people who make their careers in this novel milieu more generally. They, too, have been reverse-selected. The best of them have defected from the establishment for reasons of personal conviction, but in Germany they are joined by others whom the traditional parties excluded or expelled — often for good reason. …

The populists have been able to recruit a few incredibly talented people, but if we are honest, they have also inevitably filled their ranks with people who are inclined to various sorts of corruption, who don’t have any sincere political beliefs at all, and who are mainly interested in personal advancement. …

Media attacks on populist movements are unjust, exaggerated, and malicious, but it is very often these two factors — the eclectic nature of these movements and their reverse-selected leadership — that provide the kernel of truth at the center of many a hyped-up scandal. …

The populist parties are thus subject to substantial undirected drift, because (summarizing now) they are open to all comers, their leaders cannot control the program without risking splits or spinoffs, and criticism from within is routinely sidelined in favor of undying loyalty. This loyalty is offered to lionized figurehead leaders … or to a general political brand … , which in turn is so powerful that it eclipses the political candidates themselves.  …

The populist movements, meanwhile, appear frozen and inflexible, locked into their brands and figureheads. I fear this means they have a real expiration date, because while the Greens can f-ck up massively, alienate everybody, and come back in eight years with a different palette of candidates and a different message, the AfD is always going to be the AfD, and I have no idea what MAGA is going to be after Trump.

These movements are hostile to anyone proposing any kind of political strategy, which means that despite their growing popularity, they end up punching substantially below their weight …

There is no cavalry to rescue the day. The populists have to defeat the ruling class themselves, which requires great numbers to make up for their lack of skill and resources:

Many supporters assume that there is on the horizon a turning point, a moment of change … Then they will expel the malefactors, right the wrongs, re-migrate the migrants, tear down the wind turbines, and turn the clock back to 1996. …

Their thinking betrays, among other things, an absolutely incurable underestimation of their left-progressive opponents and a corresponding overestimation of their own strength.

They hate the people in charge, and they assume everybody else feels the same way, when in truth they are large but nevertheless still minority movements, the electoral success of which will depend upon their ability to win over outsiders.

As soon as they win, they will begin to bleed support, while most of the bureaucracy will remain arrayed against them, and the temporarily disempowered oligarchy will merely have to play a waiting game. Once they win, they will need the one thing they are most congenitally opposed to having — namely, some kind of plan and strategy for the way forward.

Eventually the peasant revolts in Europe succeeded. Economically, this gave rise to capitalism — anyone could produce anything, free of guild control and government licensing. Politically, it gave rise to our democratic republics of the 20th century — everyone was equal before the law, and the law was applied to all.

Here we are in 2026 fighting the same trends again: communism and authoritarian rule (big government) versus capitalism and democracy (small government).

Australian multiculturalism is the institutionalization of minority ethnic and religious lobbying

Australian multiculturalism is the institutionalization of minority ethnic and religious lobbying. By Celina101.

It is a system in which governments treat organised ethnic, religious and minority identity-based groups as permanent stakeholders with privileged access to policy-making.

These groups receive taxpayer funding, sit on advisory bodies, submit formal recommendations, and see their priorities turned into law on hate speech, anti-discrimination, social cohesion and diversity policy. …

So undemocratic:

Policies on hate speech, online regulation and antiwhite DEI measures are routinely justified by reference to recommendations from these same organisations and commissioners.

The justification is never “this is what a majority of Australians want.” It is “these recognised community representatives have told us this is necessary.” That arrangement inverts democratic accountability as ordinary Australians become the diffuse, unorganised interest whose preferences can be set aside when they conflict with the demands of better-connected groups.

When millions of voters express concerns about immigration levels, speech restrictions or cultural direction, the institutional response is that such views lack legitimacy within the multicultural framework, as the framework itself decides which opinions are admissible.

Australian Race Discrimination Commissioner Giridharan Sivaraman

 

This is why for example the rejection of the Aboriginal Voice to Parliament was so telling. When the unorganised Australian majority was given an opportunity to vote on a constitutionally entrenched body for one group (Aboriginals), they voted no. …

Lesser rights for whites –> second class citizens:

White Australians, as the historic majority, are told they require no such structures because the general political process already represents them while everyone else receives supplementary representation.

Under the multicultural framework “cultural and linguistic diversity” (which actually just means less white people), is a measurable policy outcome that the government actively engineers inside its own institutions.

The Albanese Government’s Employment Strategy sets an explicit target of 24 percent cultural and linguistic diversity representation in the Senior Executive Service, with an interim goal of 15 percent within four years. The Federation of Ethnic Communities’ Councils of Australia (FECCA), the main national peak body for ethnic communities, has long advocated for diversity targets in the Australian Public Service. In its 2022 policy platform, FECCA explicitly called for governments to “establish diversity targets in the Australian Public Service”, which is what the Albanese Government’s Employment Strategy did. …

Censorship is required to muzzle white complaints:

Multiculturalism as an institutional project also explains the steady expansion of speech restrictions. …

Someone, somewhere, will always be offended, so the sensibilities that must be protected are those of organised minorities rather than the population as a whole, whose rights are subordinated. …

Multiculturalism is a set of bureaucratic institutions, so reducing mass immigration is not enough:

Reducing the numbers is very necessary. But it is not sufficient. A government can slash migration tomorrow and still leave the bureaucratic and lobbying infrastructure untouched. …

The more important question is therefore civilisational and institutional. Australia is a Western nation with a particular legal tradition, political culture and historical inheritance. Immigration policy should reflect that reality by prioritising entrants from societies with compatible norms, IQs, institutions and expectations. … This argument does not require explicit discussion of race. It rests on observable differences in integration outcomes and cultural continuity. It is compatible with both civic and cultural nationalism. …

Which political party is most likely to end this anti-white bigotry?

Liberal leaders have repeatedly declared opposition to multiculturalism in principle. John Howard and Tony Abbott both did so. Yet while in office they left the grant programs and advisory councils wholely intact.  …

If Pauline Hanson and One Nation are serious about ending multiculturalism, the test is whether they are willing to do what previous governments would not: defund the peak bodies, abolish the dedicated multicultural departments and offices, repeal the speech and discrimination laws that flow from this framework, and restore the principle that government represents the Australian people as a whole.

What got Pauline Hanson dis-endorsed as a Liberal candidate in 1996 was her insistence that welfare rules be the same for all Australians, regardless of race. Surely it is not beyond the wit of Canberra smarties to funnel government aid where it is needed, such as to aboriginal communities, without discriminating on the basis of race?Aboriginal and white kids — and all the mixtures in between — in the suburbs should have the same access to welfare.

A non-racist government would be color-blind. But no, because she insisted on color-blindness, Australia’s ruling class called Hanson a “racist.” Then three decades later they tried to implement a South African Apartheid-style constitutional change — the Voice — in Australia. Talk about outing themselves as the real racists.

The government needs to get out of the racial discrimination business:

Dismantle the multicultural bureaucracy, restore free speech, end taxpayer-funded identity lobbying and reject anti-white discrimination in policy and institutions.

The advantage of this framing is that it shifts the argument from contested demographic questions to uncontested democratic ones. It does not ask Australians to dislike any particular group. It asks why unelected commissioners, funded activists and organised lobby groups should exercise greater influence over law and policy than millions of ordinary Australian citizens.

“Diversity” just means anti-white bigotry.

Non-white conquerors, mass murderers, and warlords get zero scrutiny

Non-white conquerors, mass murderers, and warlords get zero scrutiny. By Stefan Molyneux.

No one cares about imperialism or colonization or mass murder or genocide or slaughter.

Genghis Khan killed 10% of the world’s population, and he is on the Mongolian currency and has countless statues. They even named an airport after him. No one nags them.

They just hate Whites.

Restore Australia:

Communist mass murderers, Mongolian barbaric warrior elites, and African warlords all get zero scrutiny. Often they are applauded and celebrated by leftist imbeciles (especially Mao, Mandela, Guevara etc.).

The British Empire — which outlawed slavery, invented the modern world and gave the planet the agricultural/industrial revolutions, the computer, the internet, TV, phones, fibre optics, railways, jet engines, radio, antibiotics, vaccines, codified sports, property rights, common law principles, radar, sonar, penicillin, stainless steel and modern glass production — are apparently the bad guys

Former Muslim: Islam wants to take over Europe and the West

Former Muslim: Islam wants to take over Europe and the West. By Khaled Hassan.

I was never a practising, observant Muslim.

Yet, even I wanted Islam to take over Europe and the West until I was a teenager.

We are taught that Islam’s greatest achievements are conquest and colonialism.

We are taught that the greatest thing we could ever do is enable the invasion and conquest of non-Muslim countries.

This is a fact that only a former Muslim would tell you.

Political Islam has spread entirely by the sword and the womb — never by proselytizing — from the Arab peninsula starting 1400 years ago:

“Religion of peace” is one of the greatest lies ever told.

The upcoming fall of the symbol economy is already rearranging political fault lines

The upcoming fall of the symbol economy is already rearranging political fault lines. By Samuel Thawley in The Spectator.

The rise of symbol manipulation:

My grandfather was a civil engineer. He built things for a living — first in wartime England, then in Tasmania — and in the whole of his working life there was no such creature as a middle manager. There were engineers, and there were the men who dug or put together, and above them all a thin layer of owners, whether public or private. The thick, heavy slab of individuals whose job it is to manage other people who in turn manage other people had not so far been invented.

My parents went to university in Australia in the late 1960s, when — as my former boss keeps reminding me — going to university was a faintly eccentric thing to do; relatively few did at the time.

Within two generations both oddities — the middle manager and the graduate — became unremarkable. We treated them as progress. Indeed, even today it is hard to think of them as otherwise… They do, in fact, form a bubble which will come to represent this era in time, and the relative decline of these two unremarkable elements of the modern age is precisely what should worry us.

The symbol manipulators:

For 50 years, the great growth industry of the Western world has not been mining, energy, or manufacturing, or even finance. It has been the production of people who work with symbols rather than things: the graduate, the manager, the official. Call it the symbolic economy — the side of the modern workforce which processes information, administers, credentials, advises, reports.

It expanded on an unexamined assumption: that cognitive labour would stay scarce, and so valuable, indefinitely.

On that assumption an entire civilisation rebuilt its idea of the good life. Get the degree, join the firm, climb the ladder, and if all else failed there was always the security of the expanding state. …

The upcoming fall of the symbol manipulators:

Four pressures are now converging on the symbolic economy, and it is their convergence, not any one of them, that makes a crash rather than a correction.

The first is overproduction. … A credential that confers status only works if not everyone holds it; a credential everyone holds is merely the new minimum, and confers nothing. We have spent 30 years manufacturing aspirants faster than the economy manufactures the chairs they were promised. Peter Turchin calls the result elite overproduction, and the bill is arriving. …

The second pressure is [that] a pyramid can only lift everyone toward its apex if you keep building new pyramids — new firms, new divisions, new layers needing new supervisors. For decades growth obligingly supplied them. Now, the movement has reversed. Organisations merge, flatten, delayer, consolidate; the apex slots disappear even as the queue of the qualified lengthens behind them. … There is no promotion at the top of a stable pyramid, let alone one that is shrinking. … The single most stall-prone field of all was public administration, the credentialed bureaucracy itself, with nowhere left to promote anyone. …

The third pressure is political, and it is the oldest. To one set of parties the public wing of the symbolic economy is not a workforce but a swamp — a blob, a self-interested administrative class that votes for its own expansion and calls it service. The conviction that government is too big is now shared by new forces such as MAGA, Reform, and One Nation, as well as by a substantial part of the legacy right. …

The fourth pressure is artificial intelligence. Consider what happened before AI:

Washington has just run the experiment for us. The Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) delivered one of the largest peacetime cuts to the federal workforce in decades — something close to a tenth of the administration, gone inside a year. Yet federal spending kept rising — revealing almost no break where the cutting began.

The reasons are twofold. Salaries are no more than a rounding error compared with transfers, pensions and, increasingly, government interest. And across the agencies managers quietly rehired, because the work was still sitting there when the workers had gone. That is the lesson the next reforming government will absorb. You cannot shrink the state by removing people while leaving their work behind; the work simply summons the people back. …

But now with AI:

If the task itself can be done by a machine, as in the era of Victorian industrialisation, then the specific task stays cut. …

Fewer human symbol manipulators, and the blob will shrink the most:

The crash will fall across the whole symbolic economy – the graduate without the salary, the manager without the promotion – but it will fall hardest on the public servant.

The official sits at the purest node of the bubble: the part least disciplined by any market, most swollen by debt, most resented by a major part of the political spectrum, and most exposed to machines, because rules-based processing of information is exactly the work artificial intelligence learns first. …

The end of a trend:

Nothing grows forever, and the symbolic economy that was sold to us as the shape of the future was in truth the shape of a single 50-year expansion that is now passing its apotheosis.

When an expansion so large reprices, it risks creating something that is politically combustible: a large, credentialed, downwardly mobile class promised status as well as comfort and then handed an ordinary stall. They were offered a lounge — but ended up sitting like everybody else on the hard seats in the main concourse. …

Labor is the flagship party of the symbolic economy –- the graduate, the city professional, the official are at once its base and its self-portrait. They rejected the worker for the intellectual; so much that the worker has had to dress up as an intellectual to feel acceptable. So the crash does not merely cost the party votes, it dissolves the world that made the Labor party what it currently is.

This opens up a new, ugly political front. In the US, the new downwardly mobile symbol manipulators who missed out on good jobs have taken over the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) and are currently on course to takeover the Democrat Party:

[Jesse] Watters saved his sharpest criticism for the people making up that socialist wing itself. They’re candidates who have never worked a real job, whose parents bankroll them, and who rack up debt while producing nothing. “They’re professional students,” he said. “They’re all in debt. They don’t earn anything. A lot of them don’t even own anything.” Their answer to that self-inflicted mess is to declare the entire American system rigged.

Watters wasn’t buying it. “It’s actually not rigged if you work,” he said. He described grinding through cramped apartments and lean years before earning success the old-fashioned way, contrasting that with a class of Democrat candidates barely into their careers who insist the American dream is already dead. “They haven’t even tried,” he said. “What are they talking about?”

He rattled off examples, from Texas state Rep. James Talarico (D-Texas) to Democrat Senate candidate Graham Platner (D-Maine) to the socialist candidates in Colorado and New York, calling the current slate “all pathetic people.” Watters argued that their appeal comes precisely from that shared lack of accomplishment.

The producers will need to escape their entitled grasp.

Assimilation, immigration, and race.

Assimilation, immigration, and race. By Eva Vlaardingerbroek.

Moroccans in the Netherlands decided to celebrate by rioting after Morocco beat the Netherlands at the World Cup, even if many are 4th or 5th generation, born and raised here.

If they don’t regard themselves as Dutch, why should we?

Perfect candidates for Remigration I’d say.

 

hat-tip Stephen Neil

Why We Don’t Care That the Amish ‘Don’t Assimilate’

Why We Don’t Care That the Amish ‘Don’t Assimilate’. By Mark Tapson at Front Page.

Leftie Joshua Reed Eakle: “The Amish are also clearly a community that refuses to assimilate to American society. And yet no one on the right seems to care. Curious.”

Spoiler alert: contrary to what Eakle was undoubtedly implying (because “liberals” make everything about race in order to demonize their opponents rather than debate the merits of their actual position), the reason has nothing to do with race. The Right doesn’t have a problem with the Amish “not assimilating” not because they’re white, but for the following reasons, which are self-evident to any honest observer:

The Amish are not from a culture that is incompatible with and even hostile to Western civilization. Their beliefs and values may not be wholly mainstream but they are largely Christian, American values.

The Amish don’t have an ideologically supremacist imperative to overthrow the Judeo-Christian, capitalist West and to subdue non-believers.

They don’t fly hijacked planes into the World Trade Center or massacre nightclub patrons.

They don’t behead or knife random non-believers.

They don’t stone adulterers to death or hurl gay people from rooftops.

They don’t view the sexual assault of non-believers as their right.

They don’t establish “Amish Learing Centers” as fronts for defrauding American taxpayers of billions of dollars.

The Amish do have their own communal moral and legal code – the Ordnung (German for “order” or “discipline”) that has historically put them in occasional conflict with federal law: for example, the Ordnung forbids relying on government public assistance. The Amish view this as a failure to trust in God’s providence and a violation of the church’s duty to care for its own elderly and sick, so Congress granted them an official federal exemption to waive their Social Security taxes – which meant the Amish gave up any right to receive future benefits. This is hardly a burden on their fellow taxpayers.

But their default stance is to respect civic authority and pay their taxes. Most importantly, they don’t try to impose the Ordnung on non-believers.

They also don’t view themselves as an oppressed victim class and demand special government privileges. They don’t demand the establishment of prayer rooms in schools, airports, and hospitals or demand that nonbelievers around them participate in their fasting.

There is more, but I rest my case. …

Conclusion:

In truth, the Amish actually are assimilated. There simply are some areas in which they choose not to participate in mainstream culture, and who can blame them? Many Americans could actually learn, for example, from their wariness of the dangers a degenerate culture poses to their children, their community, their spirituality, and their way of life.

I hope that clears things up for Joshua Reed Eakle and his fellow race-mongers. As much as they want to make the issue of unassimilated migrants throughout the Western world about race, it is not.