Not Going to the Russian Plan

Not Going to the Russian Plan. By Streiff.

What follows is my assessment based on open-source materials.

The Russian Army’s reach exceeded its grasp. Rather than creating a single hammer blow, the Russians elected for an overly complex attack along what appears to be four axes of advance.

Unfortunately, none of the four axes are mutually supporting. Worse, the Russian Army has to create a logistics tail for each of its major attacks. The latter is not trivial. The most austere unit in the U.S. Army is a light infantry division with about 10,000 men. The front line strength in riflemen in that division is about 2,700. The other 7,300 support them. What the Russians viewed as a confusing multi-directional attack that would collapse Ukrainian resistance seems to be preventing Russia from using its numerical advantage. …

Volodymyr Zelensky has become much more of a leader than anyone thought possible. A week ago, the smart money would have said that if Russia invaded, Zelensky would be on the first thing outbound. That hasn’t happened. Not only did he give a well-received speech trying to rally his countrymen, but he’s also been visible on the streets even though he is being hunted by Spetsnaz and GRU hit squads.

The Ukrainian Army is overmatched, but it is not beaten and has not dissolved. The Ukrainian defense ministry is doing heroic service in distributing tales of Ukrainian heroism to the populace.

The Ukrainian people are not welcoming the Russians, and if this operation draws out, Russia might find itself facing an effective and motivated insurgency. In fact, Putin has probably done more to build Ukrainian nationalism than anything in modern history.