The Taliban Tried to Surrender and the U.S. Rebuffed Them. Now Here We Are. By Ryan Grim.

For centuries in Afghanistan, when a rival force had come to power, the defeated one would put down their weapons and be integrated into the new power structure — obviously with much less power, or none at all. That’s how you do with neighbors you have to continue to live with. This isn’t a football game, where the teams go to different cities when it’s over. That may be hard for us to remember, because the U.S. hasn’t fought a protracted war on its own soil since the Civil War.

So when the Taliban came to surrender, the U.S. turned them down repeatedly, in a series of arrogant blunders spelled out in Anand Gopal’s investigative treatment of the Afghanistan war, “No Good Men Among the Living.”

Only full annihilation was enough for the Bush administration. They wanted more terrorists in body bags. The problem was that the Taliban had stopped fighting, having either fled to Pakistan or melted back into civilian life. Al Qaeda, for its part, was down to a handful of members.

So how do you kill terrorists if there aren’t any?

Simple: Afghans that the U.S. worked with understood the predicament their military sponsors were in, so they fabricated bad guys. Demand has a way of creating supply, and the U.S. was paying for information that led to the death or capture of Taliban fighters. Suddenly there were Taliban everywhere. Score-settling ran amok; all you had to do to get your neighbor killed or sent to Guantánamo was tell the U.S. they were members of the Taliban.

Doors would be kicked in, no questions asked. The men left standing became warlords, built massive fortunes, and shipped their wealth abroad. “We are not nation-building again,” President Donald Trump declared Monday night. Well, we never were, unless building high-rises with looted cash in Dubai counts. …

After a few years of this charade, after their surrender efforts were repeatedly rebuffed, the old Taliban started picking up guns again. When they were driven from power, the population was happy to see them go. The U.S. managed to make them popular again.

Liberals then spent the 2008 presidential campaign complaining that the U.S. had “ignored” Afghanistan — when, in reality, the parts of the country without troop presence were the only parts at peace, facing no insurgency against the Afghan government, such as it was….

Trump’s new strategy, letting the generals run things, is not a good idea. Neither is involving Pakistan’s intelligence service, because they have been involved all along — on the other side.

I’d suggest Trump read [the book] … but it’s longer than a page, which his advisers say is the max he’ll digest.

Wow. Losing to a side that apparently surrendered 13 years ago. What a mishmash of cultural misunderstanding, hubris, and corruption on both sides.

The intelligence effort in part consisted of monitoring telecommunications and anything else about individuals. If someone crossed a certain threshold of making derogatory comments about the US or the Afghan government — “too much derog” — they were picked up and dealt with. Simplistic, but it’s hardly going to foster good will towards the foreign troops executing the scheme, let alone allow a conversation where people can work out their differences by talking.