Why Palmyra Fell to ISIS: Defense Was Left to Easily-Spooked Second String Formations, by Adam Hill.

By taking Palmyra earlier this year the Syrian army and their Russian backers gained an exposed and isolated salient deep into ISIS-controlled desert that arguably should have never been taken. …

What is far more worrying than the loss of Palmyra is the manner in which it was lost. Both times when ISIS took the town it did so far more rapidly than did the Syrian army. …

The basic reason is very simple. With all eyes on Aleppo defense of Palmyra was left to second and third string units and these just aren’t very good — especially when they’re not fighting for their local village. …

Truth is when Russians worked with the Syrian army in taking Palmyra they could barely believe the low quality of the Syrian units. (And those were at least largely Syrian Arab Army formations — whereas garrisoning the town was later largely entrusted to the even less skilled National Defense Forces militia.) …

Instead of directing them in battle the Russians had to start training Syrians right from the basics … Another problem was informants scattered among the ranks and careless use of radios which telegraphed the course of the attack to ISIS.

The quality of Arab armies is often notably poor — one need only see the Iraqi performance, or the wars against the Israelis. Which many help explain the Islamic emphasis on surprise attacks and deception about intent to attack.

hat-tip Stephen Neil