Britain’s leaving is a big deal for the European Union, but not for Britain’s security—or America’s

Britain’s leaving is a big deal for the European Union, but not for Britain’s security—or America’s, by John Schindler.

The reality is that Britain’s close ties with foreign security services will be unaffected by Brexit in any serious or long-term way. In intelligence terms, the EU hardly matters at all. It has lots of liaison jobs, no end of meetings on intelligence sharing, plus endless retreats for spy agency higher-ups—but the hard work, day in and day out, of intelligence cooperation is still largely a bilateral matter. No matter what happens with Brexit, London’s secret ties with key partners in Paris, Berlin and beyond will continue, no matter what pundits and politicos say.

Above all the Special Relationship in intelligence among Britain, America and our Anglosphere partners will go forward, as it has for more than three-quarters of a century. …

Field Marshal Lord Guthrie, the former head of Britain’s military, [came] out strongly for Leave. Initially a Remain backer, he changed his mind, terming a European Army “an expensive distraction,” adding that, militarily speaking, “a lot of the Europeans—though not the French—are hopeless. These low standards would make great demands on us.”

Here is an interesting analogy, suggesting a certain national characteristic:

For all the responsibility of Britain’s political class for this disaster, ultimate blame must fall on Germany, whose roughshod de facto rule over the EU has caused hard feelings in most member states. …

Her choice to open Europe’s doors to migrants looks a lot like Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet Union in 1941. Operation Barbarossa, whose 75th anniversary we just passed, was optimistically launched by Berlin with ideological fervor, yet without serious planning, without taking account of basic politico-economic realities, and without thinking about the many things that could go wrong. And subsequently did.